Gentle Reader – You will search in vain for a Report such as this one detailing how we allowed ourselves to wage a war of aggression on Iraq. Clearly, the perpetrators of this war had not read – or have not understood the meaning of – the Nuremberg Trials.
As we lurch from one folly to another, “looking forward, not back”, we never properly debrief, so we continue to make the same mistakes. Our latest being the election as President of a racist, sexual predator, who has clearly stated he will order our military to perpetrate war crimes.
This edit, begun in July of 2016, is complete today, 16 April, 2017. !.5 million words, all to describe how we and our allies waged a war of aggression on the benighted country of Iraq. A war that continues to this day.
Sixteen years of war, my dear readers, and what do we have for this ? A militarized country, debt, a failing infrastructure, and an inhabitant in the White House who brings nothing but shame upon us all. Who may represent the biggest threat to peace in many years.
Read. Comment.
The Iraq Report: Statement by Sir John Chilcot
Executive Summary
Introduction
VOLUME 1
1.Volume 1, Section 1.1 UK – Iraq Strategy 1990 To 2000
2. Volume 1, Section 1.2 Development of UK Strategy and Options – September 2000 to September 2001
3. Volume 1, Section 2.0 Decision Making within the Government
4. Volume 1, Section 3.1 Development of UK Strategy and Options – 9/11 to Early January 2003
5. Volume 1, Section 3.2 Development of UK Strategy and Options,
January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford
January to April 2002 – “Axis of Evil” to Crawford
VOLUME 2
3. Volume 2, Section 3.3 Development of UK Strategy and Options – April to July 2002
4. Volume 2, Section 3.4 Development of UK Strategy and Options – Late-July to 14 September 2002
https://ajlayon.com/2017/03/06/development-of-uk-strategy-and-options-late-july-to-14-september-2002
5. Volume 2, Section 3.5 Development of UK Strategy and Options – September to November 2002 – The Negotiation of Resolution 1441
VOLUME 3
1. Volume 3, Section 3.6 Development of UK Strategy & Options, November 2002 to January 2003
2. Volume 3, Section 3.7 Development of UK Strategy & Options, 1 February to 7 March, 2003
3. Volume 3, Section 3.8 Development of UK Strategy and Options, 8 to 20 March, 2003
VOLUME 4
1.Volume 4, Section 4.0 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction
2. Volume 4, Section 4.1 Iraq WMD Assessments, Pre-July 2002
3. Volume 4, Section 4.2 Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
4. Volume 4, Section 4.3 Iraq WMD Assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
5. Volume 4, Section 4.4 The Search for WMD
VOLUME 5
1. Volume 5, Section 5.0 Advice on the Legal Basis for Military Action, November 2002 – March 203
2. Volume 5, Section 6.1 Development of the Military Options for an Invasion of Iraq
3. Volume 5, Section 6.2 Military Planning for the Invasion, January – March 2003
VOLUME 6
1. Volume 6, Section 6.3 Military Equipment (Pre-Conflict)
2. Volume 6, Section 6.4 Planning and Preparation for a Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003
3. Volume 6, Section 6.5 Planning and Preparation for a Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003
4. Volume 6, Section 7 Conclusions: Pre-Conflict Strategy and Planning
VOLUME 7
1. Volume 7, Section 8 The Invasion
1. Volume 7, Section 8 The Invasion
2. Volume 7, Section 9.1 March to May 2003
3. Volume 7, Section 9.2 May 2003 to June 2004
4. Volume 7, Section 9.3 July 2004 to May 2005
5. Volume 7, Section 9.4 June 2005 to May 2006
VOLUME 8
1.Volume 8, Section 9.5 June 2006 to 27 June, 2007
2. Volume 8, Section 9.6 27 June 2007 To April 2008
3. Volume 8, Section 9.7 May 2008 To October 2009
4. Volume 8, Section 9.8 Conclusion: The Post Conflict Period
Volume 9
1. Volume 9, Section 10.1 Reconstruction: March 2003 To June 2004
2. Volume 9, Section 10.2 Reconstruction: July 2004 – July 2009
3. Volume 9, Section 10.3 Reconstruction – Oil and Others
4. Volume 9, Section 10.4 Conclusions: Reconstruction
VOLUME 10
1. Volume 10, Section 11.1 De-Baathification
2. Volume 10, Section 11.2 Conclusions: De-Baathification
3. Volume 10, Section 12.1 Security Sector Reform
4. Volume 10, Section 12.2 Conclusions: Security Sector Reform
5. Volume 10, Section 13.1 Resources
6. Volume 10, Section 13.2 Conclusions: Resources
VOLUME 11
1. Volume 11, Section 14.1 Military Equipment (Post-Conflict)
2. Volume 11, Section 14.2 Conclusions: Military Equipment (Post-Conflict)
3. Volume 11, Section 15.1 Civilian Personnel
4. Volume 11, Section 15.2 Conclusions: Civilian Personnel
VOLUME 12
1. Volume 12, Section 16.1 Welfare of Service Personnel
2. Volume 12, Section 16.2 Support for Service Personnel and Veterans
3. Volume 12, Section 16.3 Military Families and the Bereaved
4. Volume 12, Section 16.4 Conclusions: Service Personnel
5. Volume 12, Section 17.0 Civilian Casualties